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In his book Biblical Myth and Rabbinic Mythmaking,1 Michael Fishbane vehe­
mently and convincingly rejects the widespread idea that, in the words of 
Yehezkel Kaufmann, 'biblical religion is in essence non­mythological',2 and 
that the turn from polytheism to monotheism meant a categorical rejection of 
myth.3 According to Fishbane, myth in its various intellectual and literary forms 
constitutes rather a continuity between prebiblical polytheism, biblical religion, 
and postbiblical rabbinic Judaism. Fishbane's definition of myth as referring to 
'[sacred and authoritative] accounts of the deeds and personalities of the gods 
and heroes during the formative events of primordial times, or during the 
subsequent historical interventions or actions of these figures which are consti­
tutive for the founding of a given culture and its rituals'4 accommodates not only 
Babylonian, Egyptian, and Greek tales about gods but also biblical accounts of 
God's interventions into history, such as, above all, the story of Exodus. 
While deconstructing the conventional opposition of myth and monothe­
ism, however, Fishbane introduces another distinction that allows the demar­
cation of a shift within this continuity, at least between biblical and 
misdrashic ways of speaking about God: 'Moreover, the intensified focus on 
the pathos of God, and His participation in the events of biblical Israel, marks 
a shift f rom the historia sacra of the people (the keynote of Scripture) to the 
historia divina of myth (a keynote of Midrash).'5 Historia divina refers to the 
general concept of myth applying to extrabiblical, biblical, and postbiblical 
religions as the history of gods or God, whereas historia sacra refers to the 
specifically monotheistic and biblical, both Jewish and Christian, concept of 
myth as history being preordained and governed by God. 
I consider Fishbane's distinction a major breakthrough in our understand­
ing not only of biblical and postbiblical history but also of ancient oriental 
thought in general. As an Egyptologist, I am primarily interested not so much 
in the shift f rom biblical to postbiblical Judaism or Christianity as in the shift 
from prebiblical to biblical myth, and feel invited to tentatively apply Fish­
bane's distinction to ancient Egyptian and ancient Mesopotamian mythology. 
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Fishbane is certainly right (as was Thomas Mann in his Joseph novels6) to 
reject the easy construction of this shift in terms of 'myth versus monotheism', 
since myth is on both sides. Yet a shift there is, and his distinction between 
historia divina and historia sacra may perhaps provide a conceptual tool for a 
more convincing description of this difference. Is it possible to describe the 
contrast between the polytheistic and the biblical ways of dealing with history 
as a shift f rom historia divina to historia sacral Is the term historia sacra 
applicable at all to extrabiblical phenomena? 
Let us start f rom an at tempt to define these terms. Historia divina is the 
history of God or gods. This concept presupposes that God 'has' a history—as 
opposed to the conception of a categorically transcendent and timeless God, a 
concept which is certainly anachronistic with respect to the Bible but central 
to later Christian and Islamic theology. Historia sacra is history as shared by 
God or gods in one way or other. 'Having' a history is, of course, no problem 
with regard to Egyptian, Babylonian, or Greek gods. Historia divina is the 
proper form of speaking about gods existing in a divine world or pantheon. 
Historia divina is the narrative structure of the divine world. Its logical 
counterpart is not historia sacra but historia humana, to be defined as the 
narrative structure of the human world. For the monotheistic concept of God, 
there is no divine world to share.7 The only possibility for God to 'have' a 
history is to share the human realm of history, which by divine participation 
is then turned into historia sacra. 
In what follows I will shift the emphasis f rom theology to history. By 
history, be it historia divina, historia sacra, or historia profana or humana, 
I understand not the past as such, but the narrative representation of the past. 
My thesis is that such a thing as the narrative representation of the past is 
anything but normal and self-evident. It requires a general cultural option for 
change over against identity and continuity. The past, in order to become the 
subject of such a representation, must in itself possess a kind of narrative 
structure. There must be something to tell in order to provoke a representa­
tion of any importance and interest. The concept of narration implies change 
and transformation; this additional definition is important . The typical 
structure of an event is the transformation of a situation A into its contrary A. 
It is this event­structure that makes the past narratable. If we apply this concept 
of narrative structure to historia divina, we meet with a plethora of myths that 
tell of such events transforming a state A into a state A. The gods have worked all 
the changes that constitute present reality. 
The past, however, in which these actions took place is of a very specific 
kind. It is an 'absolute past' that keeps equal distance to a moving present. 
Mircea Eliade characterized this concept of a mythical past by the Latin 
formula 'in illo tempore'.8 Mythical t ime belongs to another temporality 
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than that to which historical time belongs. Events in historical time share the 
same temporality with the present, which means that the distance between the 
historical event and a given moment in present time can be measured in terms 
of years and months. Mythical time, on the other hand, does not allow for this 
form of localization and distanciation. It constitutes a temporality of its own. 
Its 'pastness' is of a kind that may be re-presented or 'presentified' by ritual or 
dramatic or rhapsodic performance. 
Historia divina is about events in the absolute past, 'in illo tempore', and 
history is about events in the historical past with a precise place in chron­
ology. History as the narrative representation of the past reflects the narrative 
structure of the human world (in terms of events and transformations), in the 
same way as the narrative representation of the absolute past or myth reflects 
the narrative structure of the divine world. 
Equipped with these definitions and conceptual tools, we can see that, in fact, 
there is comparatively little in terms of historia divina (in the strict sense of a 
narrative presentation of a divine past 'in illo tempore') in the Bible, but an 
enormous number of datable events and a extraordinarily comprehensive rep­
resentation of the past from the first day of Creation down to the reign of the 
Persian king Artaxerxes. In ancient Egypt, on the other hand, there is a plethora 
of historia divina, that is, narrative representations of events taking place in the 
divine world, and a very conspicuous absence of any narrative representation of 
the historical or human past. Instead of history, defined as the narrative repre­
sentation of the past, we meet with anti­history, which may be defined as the 
non­narrative representation of the past.9 Examples of non­narrative represen­
tations of the past may be found in annals and king­lists, that is, in enumerations 
of facts but not of events in the sense of transformatory processes that lead to 
something new instigating narration and remembering. Non­narrrative repre­
sentations of the past are tools of chronological orientation. Narrative represen­
tations of the past are forms of collective memory and identity; they are 'the 
intellectual form in which a society gives account to itself of its past', to quote 
Johan Huizinga's famous definition of history.10 They are related to memory and 
identity, because they tell of events that brought about, and are therefore able to 
explain, the present as the result of a development. 
What we learn from these observations is that the past is not, as such, 
already an object of narrative representation. There is no natural drive to 
represent the past in the form of historical narrative. Representing the past or 
'history' requires generators of meaning in order to make the past narratable, 
to turn facts into events, and to relate past events to present situations. The 
early states, such as ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, had a strong need for 
chronological orientation but obviously not for history. This state of affairs 
applies above all to ancient Egypt, and is beautifully reflected in an anecdote 
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told by Herodotus. When Hecataeus of Miletos came to Thebes in Egypt, he 
boasted of his pedigree ending with a god in the sixteenth generation. The 
Egyptian priests took the noble Hecataeus into their temple and showed him 
341 statues of highpriests—341 generations of priests, one being the son and 
successor of the other, without any deity interfering. 'This means then,' 
Herodotus resumes, 'that for a time-period of 11,340 years, exclusively 
human kings ruled over Egypt', making sure that we are dealing here with 
an exclusively human history, or rather, past, because these 11,340 years lack 
the narrative structure they would need to become history. This is made clear 
by Herodotus' additional remarks: 'Within this time-span, the sun is reported 
to have changed its course several times. Twice it has risen where it now sets 
and has set where it now rises. But this did not cause any changes in the 
Egyptian world, neither in the vegetation nor in the activity of the river, nor 
with regard to diseases and death in the human world' (2.143). This seemingly 
absurd remark nonetheless offers a deep insight into the non-narrative struc­
ture of the Egyptian concept of the past. Narrative is about time as change. 
Time without change can only be counted or measured, not narrated. The 
ancient Egyptian king­list is a tool of time­reckoning and chronological 
orientation, but not a narrative representation of the past.11 The absence of 
narrative representation may be called anti­history, since it is the result of a 
cultural option against history. 
The distinction between history and anti­history goes back to Claude Levi­
Strauss and his distinction between cold and hot societies. Cold societies, 
according to Levi­Strauss, 'strive, by means of the institutions they are giving 
themselves, to erase quasi­automatically the effect which historical factors could 
have on their equilibrium and their continuity' ('grace aux institutions qu'elles 
se donnent, a . . . annuler de facon quasi automatique l'effet que les facteurs 
historiques pourraient avoir sur leur equilibre et leur continuite'). 'Hot societies', 
on the other hand, 'are characterized by a desire for change and interiorize their 
history (leur devenir historique) in order to make it the motor of their devel­
opment.'12 Levi­Strauss is interested in deconstructing the conventional concept 
of oral societies as lacking history. Coldness, in his view, is not a lack but a 
positive achievement. He is right, and the decisive term is 'institution'. 
I must admit that I do not believe in hot and cold societies, but I believe in 
institutions producing cultural 'heat' or 'coldness', that is, freezing or empha­
sizing, excluding or featuring change. The Egyptian king­list is an institution 
that freezes change, a fact perspicaciously recognized by Herodotus. For the 
Egyptian understanding, change belongs to the time of the gods, when the 
world was created and the institutions were founded. These are the changes 
that are narrated by the myths. If changes occur in the human time of history, 
they are interpreted as irruptions of chaos, which may only be lamented but 
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not narrated, because they lack meaning and coherence. The Egyptian word 
for 'event', kheperut, has strong negative connotations, as in China, where 
people wish each other well by wishing for 'eventless times'. Kheperut is 
something to be avoided and fenced off. In a wisdom text, we read that 
God gave humans magic as a weapon to ward off the blow of kheperut.13 
In Mesopotamia the situation is slighdy different. The Sumerian state also 
created a king-list as a tool of time-reckoning, which is very similar to the 
Egyptian king-list.14 Both show a tripartite structure, starting with the creation 
of the world and a succession of gods, and then giving a list of heroes or demi­
gods until they pass to human kings, of whom they give a complete list down to 
the reigning king.15 There is, however, a striking difference between the 
Egyptian and the Mesopotamian king­lists, in that the Mesopotamian list 
shows some remarkable beginnings of narrative elaboration. Moreover, there 
are not a few texts outside the king­list tradition that stretch back over a series 
of different reigns into the remote past.16 An early text of this genre, known 
under the title 'Curse on Aggade',17 is the history of the rise and fall of the 
Sargonid Dynasty in the twenty­third and twenty­second centuries BCE. 
Among other events, it relates how King Naramsin destroyed the temple of 
Enlil in Nippur, and how Enlil answered this crime by sending the Guteans, 
who put an end to the ruling dynasty. The Neo­Babylonian 'Weidner Chron­
icle' (first century BCE) reaches much farther back in time. This chronicle gives 
an account of a series of dynasties, and connects the success of a king's reign 
with his attitude towards the Esagila, the temple of Marduk in Babylon.18 In 
various cases, the fall of a dynasty and the transition of rule from one dynasty 
to another are explained by a guilt that one or several rulers accumulated 
during their reign. The fall of the empire of Ur is traced back to certain forfeits 
committed by King Shulgi.19 The juridical concept of guilt and punishments 
gives meaning to history and coherence to the chain of events and the sequence 
of dynasties. Here, as in Egypt, the concept of 'event' is invested with rather 
negative connotations. But the difference between the Egyptian and the Meso­
potamian concepts of event is obvious. In Egypt, the event is a manifestation of 
chaos and contingency, without any meaning. In Mesopotamia, however, the 
event is full of meaning. It is read as the manifestation of the punishing will of a 
divinity whose anger has been raised by the king.20 
What are, in Mesopotamia, the generators of history, the factors that bestow 
meaning and coherence onto past facts and turn them into narratable events? 
Two ideas seem to me decisive for the Mesopotamian concept of history: one is 
the idea of 'connective justice', the connection of guilt and punishment that 
connects events in terms of cause and consequence;21 and the other is the role of 
the gods, who intervene in human history as agents of punishment We see that 
we are not dealing here with purely human history, but with a kind of history in 
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which the gods are heavily involved, and that it is this divine involvement that 
turns facts into events and makes the past narratable. In other words, history 
emerges in Mesopotamia as historia sacra, at least in its incipient stages. The 
biblical concept of historia sacra implies these same two ideas: 'connective 
justice' and divine intervention. Divine intervention is not sufficient to define 
the biblical concept of history; it clearly defines the event, but not the concat­
enation of events into a coherent storyline. The concept of history needs 
connectives, such as causality: event A led to a state B, which through divine 
intervention or any other event C was transformed into a state D, and so forth. 
This connective principle is provided by 'connective justice'. In other words, 
connective justice functions like causality, defining an ensuing event not just as 
an 'effect' but in terms of reward and punishment.22 
In Mesopotamia the gods appear as the agents of justice. This has much to do 
with divination, which played an absolutely central role in Babylonia. Every­
thing depends on the correct interpretion of the signs expressing the will of the 
gods. A sign points to a future event and presupposes a finality between the will 
of the gods and the vicissitudes of history. In Egypt the will of the gods is 
absorbed in the task of maintaining the world; in Mesopotamia the divine will is 
sufficiently free to extend its range into human affairs. As a result, history forms 
a realm of religious meaning and experience, and becomes a matter of discursive 
communication and representation.23 Even in Egypt, this model grows more 
and more influential and leads to considerable changes, especially in the his­
toriographical genres: the private autobiography and the royal inscriptions.24 
The traditional theology of maintenance is complemented by a theology of will 
that imbues the realm of kheperut ('all that happens') with meaning. 
In Mesopotamia the gods intervene in history because they are explicitly 
invited to do so. The theologization of history results f rom certain institutions 
of international law. Unlike Egypt, which knew a central government right 
f rom the start, Mesopotamia went through a long period of polycentrism, 
with city­states related to each other by treaties and conflicts. In this situation 
Mesopotamia formed concepts and institutions not only of national but also 
of international law. The political institutions of the city­state were able to 
maintain justice within the state, but for the maintenance of law and order 
among the various states the gods were made responsible. They were called 
upon to watch over the strict observance of the treaties between states and to 
punish any transgressions. Treaties had to be sealed by a solemn oath sworn 
by both parties submitting themselves to divine supervision.25 In the same 
way as the legal institutions of the state maintain justice inside the state, so the 
will and the 'wrath' of the gods maintain justice between states. 
This tradition of international law leads in the Hittite Empire to the 
formation of two different contexts for the representation of the past. One 
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is the same as in Mesopotamia: the context of justice and guilt. When a 
catastrophe occurs, it will be traced back to the intervention of an offended 
deity. The typical offence is the violation of a treaty. Divine wrath can only be 
reconciled by confession and repentance. This leads to discourses of historical 
reconstruction. The most elaborate examples are the confessory prayers of 
King Mursilis, who after twenty years of pestilence tried to reconcile the gods 
by publicly confessing a sin committed more than twenty years before by his 
father, who broke a treaty with the Egyptians by attacking the Syrian town of 
Amqa, which then belonged to Egypt. These prayers, together with the annals 
of his father, Shuppiluliuma, telling the same story, figure among the most 
elaborate pieces of cuneiform historiography.26 
The other context of reconstructing the past is the Hittite custom of 
introducing state treaties with a long recapitulation of the common history 
of both parties forming the alliance. The alliance is built upon the foundation 
of a past of mutual friendship and support, giving reason to believe in the 
stability of the contract and the loyalty of the partners.27 
A third genre of representing the past is the royal apology. This genre too 
flourishes in Hittite historiography, which has transmitted to us the most 
impressive and elaborate examples, especially the historical accounts of 
usurpers such as Telepinus or Hattusilis III. These usurpers want to justify 
their illegitimate ascension to the throne by pointing out the obvious blessing 
the gods bestow on their reign, or pointing out the injustice of their prede­
cessors, the ensuing misfortunes, and the turn for the better brought about by 
their own rule.28 
All three of these traditional genres of cuneiform historiography come to 
their fullest fruition only in the Bible, where they develop into large­scale 
compositions comprising one or even several entire books. The first form, 
which we may call confessory historiography, generates in the Bible the 
'Deuteronomic' tradition of history­writing, in which every reign is judged 
according to the principle of the king's obedience to the law and which, with 
few exceptions, is a long story of disobedience, disloyalty, apostasy, injustice, 
and idolatry—in short, a story of an accumulation of guilt leading finally to 
the catastrophe of the destruction of Jerusalem and the Babylonian exile. The 
second form, which may be called covenantal history, lies behind the books of 
Exodus and Deuteronomy, where the law—that is, the treaty proper—is 
introduced by the history of how God intervened for the redemption of his 
chosen people. The book of Deuteronomy contains not only the historical 
introduction and the body of stipulations, but even the curses that tradition­
ally form the close of a treaty.29 The third form, the royal apology, is 
represented in the Bible by the elaborate accounts dedicated to the reigns of 
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kings Saul, David, and Solomon, and especially to David, whose dynastic 
legitimacy was more than dubious.3 0 
Biblical historiography is the apex of Mesopotamian and Hittite traditions 
of history-writing. The development that leads in the Bible to its ultimate 
perfection can be identified as the sacralization of history. The idea of forming 
an alliance with God Himself, and with one God only instead of appointing 
several gods as supervisors of political alliances, draws this one chosen God 
much closer into the ups and downs of his chosen people than had been the 
case in Mesopotamia and its neighboring civilizations. There, history was just 
a field of possible favourable or punishing interventions by the gods; now it 
turns into one coherent connection of events, stretching f rom creation until 
the end of the world, known as historia sacra in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. 
Within the frame of historia sacra, the concatenation of events is structured not 
only by reward and punishment but also, and above all, by promise and 
providence. Historia sacra is not only a representation of the past, but also a 
project and a program. This aspect seems to be lacking in Mesopotamia. 
The Mesopotamian and Hittite conceptions of history emerge, as we have 
seen, in the context of moral and legal thinking, and remain to be closely 
connected to the notions of law, guilt, verdict, and punishment, right through 
the entire biblical tradition up to its secularized version in Hegel's philosophy 
of history, as most clearly expressed in his formula 'Die Weltgeschichte ist das 
Weltgericht', which is a quote f rom Schiller's poem Resignation. No concept of 
history could claim more actuality for our present concern with the repre­
sentation of the past than this most ancient and original concept of history. 
Especially in Germany, guilt has confirmed itself as the strongest and most 
productive generator of historical discourse. The juridical frame of account­
giving, of accepting responsibility not only for one's own deeds but also for a 
past stretching into several generations of predecessors, especially in the 
international context of alliances to be formed and maintained, remains or 
becomes again the most prominent context for the the reconstruction and 
communicat ion of the past. 
Where in this tableau, however, is the place of human history, historia profana, 
so to speak, history as a purely human affair without divine impact? It is this 
question that leads to the recognition of Herodotus as the 'father of history'. 
Herodotus seems to have been the first writer to narrate the past for its own sake, 
to interpret events as consequences not of divine intervention but of human 
decisions and actions. He seems also to have been the first to ask for causality and 
not for justice in the course of history. In this respect, Christian Meier, for 
instance, is right to recognize only the work of Herodotus as historiography, 
and to exclude all that has emerged in the ancient Near East long before 
Herodotus in forms of narrative representations of the past.31 Meier not only 
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denies these Mesopotamian and biblical forms of representing the past any claim 
to be recognized as historiography, he even takes them to be the contrary of 
historiography, that is, to belong to myth. For Meier, Herodotus' epoch-making 
achievement consists in the destruction of the very constructions that, in the 
ancient Near East, had made possible the articulation and representation of time 
past. Only the emancipation from sense-making assumptions of normative 
truth ('there cannot be what must not be') and connective justice (morally bad 
actions lead to disastrous results for the actor) opens the way for the contingency 
of history, its 'Eigensinn'. Seen from the vantage-point of this position, the 
oriental and biblical forms of historiography appear as the opposite of history, 
as the quintessential manifestations of what had to be overcome in order to break 
through towards history proper.32 
The soundness of Meier's arguments cannot be denied. If we consider the 
Greek concept of history, both historia divina and historia sacra appear as 
myth. Fishbane's distinction makes it possible to solve this problem. There 
seem to be two different kinds of myth: one based on historia divina and 
related to mythical time, the absolute past ' in illo tempore'; and the other 
based on historia sacra and related to historical time. These myths are made of 
the stuff of history: they are not about the birth and death, the actions and 
sufferings of gods and demi-gods, but of human beings. However, they are not 
just narrative representations of the past as a series of events, but foundational 
stories that define the identity, the central values, and the common ideals of a 
group. Reserving the term 'myth' for narratives concerning historia divina 
would mean denying narratives such as the stories of the Exodus f rom Egypt 
the status of myth. Fishbane is certainly right to include the stories of the 
Exodus, Sinai, the wilderness, and conquest, or the stories about the patri­
archs, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Joseph, in his concept of myth. These are 
without any doubt foundational stories determining the memory and identity 
of Israel as a religious and ethnic community, taking place not 'in illo tempore' 
but in historical t ime (however fictional this placement may be). 
However, may we perhaps go further and generalize the concept of historia 
sacra so far as to include all myths that are not historia divina taking place ' in 
illo tempore', but that are related to historical time? May we go so far as to 
allow other people, religions, cultures, and societies a historia sacra of their 
own, or is this concept by definition restricted to the Judaeo­Christian 
context? To be sure, the concept of historia sacra has semantic elements that 
defy any extension beyond biblical monotheism, Jewish or Christian. One 
such element is, above all, the concept of paganism, which is implied in its 
opposite term, historia profana. Historia prof ana is the history of the 'peoples', 
the 'nations' {goyim, gentium), as opposed to the history of the one chosen 
people. The concept of historia sacra rests, therefore, on what I have called the 
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'Mosaic distinction'.33 We have to weaken the concept of historia sacra by this 
distinction between true religion and paganism in order to be able to under­
stand the foundational myths of other peoples as their historiae sacrae. They 
are then to be defined as representations of their specific normative past based 
on: (a) a concept of connective justice or morality; (b) a not ion of sacrality, be 
it the will of God or an emphatic notion of community, nation, and empire; 
and (c) an idea of promise, project, or program involving goals to achieve, 
ideals to realize, and values to enforce. I am wondering whether, in an age of 
globalization, this weak or extended notion of historia sacra is not gaining 
momentum. There are goals that 'we', as humani ty and inhabitants of this 
endangered planet, must achieve, and there are things we must never forget in 
order to achieve these goals. 
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